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1. Introduction   
Blame is a central part of our moral and practical lives. Negative emotional responses, 
reproach, and demands for apology are all typical features of our blaming practices. We are 
perhaps most familiar with the idea of blaming people for their actions. For example, if your 
friend shows up late for a meeting and explains that they simply felt like arriving late without 
informing you, it might be a fitting response to blame them for being late. In addition to one’s 
actions, a person can be the target of negative emotional responses, reproach, and possibly even 
demands for apology for their beliefs, or intellectual conduct more broadly. For example, when 
an employer forms a belief about an employee’s job performance on the basis of socio-
economic stereotypes, it may be fitting to reproach or in other words blame the employer for 
forming a belief on such a basis. Or if your friend forms their beliefs about politics solely on 
the basis of their Facebook feed, there may be conditions under which it would be fitting to 
reproach or in other words blame them for forming beliefs on such a basis. In epistemology, 
this sort of response is increasingly understood as a kind of “epistemic blame.”  
While moral philosophers have developed a wide range of theories about the nature of 
moral blame, the nature of our practice of responding to one another for epistemic failings has 
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only recently seen detailed exploration. What exactly is epistemic blame, and what is its 
relation to moral blame? When is it appropriate to epistemically blame another person? Should 
we engage in a practice of epistemically blaming one another? What, if anything, can the nature 
of epistemic blame tell us about epistemic normativity? This article surveys the state of this 
increasingly active, yet controversial area of study. It also highlights areas where future 
research is needed. Section 2 begins with preliminaries, articulating a way of understanding 
what it means for an instance of blame to be epistemic. Section 3 outlines some prominent 
ways of motivating the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. Section 4 
surveys four different views about the nature of epistemic blame. Section 5 explores issues 
surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic blame. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Preliminaries   
What makes an instance of blame epistemic as opposed to moral or something else? Some 
philosophers have defined epistemic blame as a kind of blame for belief, or other doxastic 
states, such as disbelief, or suspension of belief (Rettler 2017; Nottelmann 2007; van 
Woudenberg 2009). In the present context, this can lead to confusion since there seem to be 
cases of blame for doxastic states that are primarily moral in nature. Tara believes there is no 
point in respecting other people’s feelings, simply because she’s had enough with the world 
and doesn't care anymore. She hasn’t acted on this belief, and has no plans to. But in 
conversation, her sister Toni learns about this unsettling turn in Tara’s moral outlook, and 
blames her for even thinking this way. It is natural to think of Toni’s reaction as a kind of moral 
blame, as opposed to, or perhaps in addition to, something deserving the title “epistemic 
blame”.1 Conversely, there may be cases of epistemic blame that do not target a person’s 
 
1 See Begby 2018 and Basu 2019 for helpful discussion of morally blameworthy belief. 
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doxastic states, at least not directly, or primarily. For example, epistemic blame may target an 
assertion, an action of inquiry, or a particular inference someone makes.    
On a wider usage, epistemic blame is not merely blame for belief, though beliefs may 
be paradigm targets; rather, epistemic blame is a kind of blame directed at someone for an 
epistemic failing. Susan blames her colleague Max for inquiring about Prince Harry’s love life, 
merely by consulting unreliable tabloid magazines. In this case, an epistemic norm has been 
violated, the target of blame has epistemically failed in some way. The idea is that an epistemic 
blame response is a response to that failing. There are at least two ways of understanding this 
wider view. First, we might take it to entail simply that people can be morally blamed for 
epistemic failings.2 Perhaps blame for epistemic failings is the same sort of thing as moral 
blame, even though what is at issue is a distinctive kind of failing. One challenge for this 
approach is that it seems we can blame people for epistemic conduct that is not immoral. As 
Qassim Cassam argues, it seems overly moralistic to maintain that all epistemically 
blameworthy conduct is also worthy of moral blame (2019, 18). The example of Max is a 
potential case in point.  
An alternative approach holds that epistemic blame is a distinctive form of blame for 
epistemic failings. One way to articulate this idea is in terms of the kinds of goods that 
epistemic blamers, as such, are in some sense concerned with. We might say that epistemic 
blame is a kind of blame for epistemic failings oriented distinctively around the promotion of 
epistemic goods such as believing truly and avoiding believing falsely (Boult 2020, 2021; 
Brown 2020a, 2020b; Piovarchy forthcoming; Schmidt 2021).3 On this approach, many targets 
 
2 Or blamed in some other practical way, such as professionally. 
3 I leave the connection between epistemic blame and the promotion of epistemic goods purposely imprecise. It 
is difficult to say anything more precise without taking on theoretical commitments about the function of epistemic 
blame. However, note that I do not mean to imply here that a person must consciously endorse epistemic norms 
in order to count as epistemically blaming someone. A more plausible way of understanding the connection might 
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of epistemic blame may also be fitting targets of moral blame, but they need not be. Unless 
stated otherwise, I shall have this conception of epistemic blame in mind in the remainder of 
this article.  
A final preliminary point to emphasize is the following. Rather than merely negatively 
evaluating—for example, by forming a judgment that someone is epistemically unjustified, or 
perhaps even epistemically blameworthy—epistemic blamers, like their moral-blaming 
counterparts, are in some way engaged by their negative epistemic evaluations. As Pamela 
Hieronymi says, blame has a characteristic “sting”, “force”, and “depth” (Hieronymi 2004, 
116-117). Presumably, if there is a distinction to draw between moral blame and negative moral 
evaluation, something similar holds true of epistemic blame. A central task in developing a 
better understanding of epistemic blame is explaining what this engagement consists in. We 
will return to an exploration of such options in Section 4.  
 
3. Motivating Epistemic Blame   
Not everyone is convinced that there is such thing as epistemic blame. Reasons for skepticism 
include worries about the kind of control we have over doxastic states (Alston 1988),4 the 
relationship between ethics and epistemology (Zagzebski 1996, xiv, 6; Roberts and Wood 
2007, 60), and the idea that blame just is a moral concept, not an epistemic one (Kauppinen 
2018). Rather than directly engage with these skeptical outlooks here, I will instead present a 
couple of ways of motivating the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.5 
 
go via a causal-historical story about the practice of epistemic blame, connecting this practice to the needs that an 
epistemic community has for the acquisition and maintenance of epistemic goods (see Sections 4.4 and Section 5 
for more discussion). 
4 Alston’s is the classic discussion of this worry. There are many others, including: Chuard & Southwood 2009; 
Chrisman 2016; Nolfi 2014; Owens 2000; Ryan 2003. See Rettler 2017 for a recent response.  
5 See Boult (2020) for further discussion of epistemic blame skepticism. Other prominent skeptics include 
Dougherty (2012, 2014), Schleifer-McCormick (2020), and Skorupski (2010).  
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These lines of thought feature prominently in the literature, whether implicitly or explicitly. 
The first appeals to normative parallels between ethics and epistemology; the second appeals 
to the role that the concept of blame plays in a number of contemporary epistemological 
debates.  
 
3.1 Normative Parallels  
It has become commonplace in philosophy to treat ethics and epistemology as importantly 
related to one other. They are often both regarded as normative domains, in the sense that ethics 
is about what we ought to do, and epistemology is about what we ought to believe. This is a 
large oversimplification. But it is a useful starting point for illuminating some ways ethics and 
epistemology seem to parallel one another. Epistemologists interested in drawing such parallels 
typically focus on claims about reasons, justification, virtues, obligations, permissions, norms, 
and so on. In each case, there seem to be both moral/practical and epistemic varieties of these 
phenomena. More recently, we have also begun seeing epistemologists draw attention to things 
like epistemic dilemmas (Hughes forthcoming; McCain, Stapleford & Steup forthcoming), 
epistemic rights (Watson 2020), and epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007; Pohlhaus 2014; 
Wanderer 2012, 2017) in drawing or presupposing parallels between the epistemic and moral 
domains.  
What relevance do any of these parallels have for epistemic blame? Proponents of 
epistemic blame can make at least two key arguments here. The first is the following:  
i) Blame is a central concept of ethics. 
ii) There are many parallels between ethics and epistemology. 
iii) So, we should expect there to be a kind of blame in epistemology—perhaps a 
distinctively epistemic kind of blame.  
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Taken on its own, this is perhaps not an especially strong argument. After all, there might be 
an important difference between blame and other normative phenomena which renders all these 
parallels an unrepresentative basis upon which to reason inductively like this. However, and 
this is the second key argument, rather than simply being a random collection of similarities, 
most of these parallels are systematically interconnected. For instance, the concept of a reason 
is connected to the concept of rationality; the concepts of permission and obligation are 
connected to the concept of justification; and so on. Perhaps we should expect these parallels 
to tell us something about epistemic blame, because they concern an interrelated web of 
concepts.  
This leads to a key insight: “ought”-judgments, reasons, and many other normative 
concepts in the moral domain stand in an intimate relationship with blame. For instance, a 
minimal condition on being the appropriate target of blame is that you’ve done something you 
ought not to have done, or that you weren’t permitted to do. Also, it seems one cannot be 
blameworthy for doing something that one had no reason not to do. Given that “ought”-
judgments, reasons, and permissions clearly seem at home in the epistemic domain, perhaps 
we should expect there to be an epistemic kind of blame. Perhaps we should expect the parallel 
concepts of the epistemic “ought”, epistemic reasons, and epistemic permissions to bear a 
family connection to epistemic blame and blameworthiness.6  
 
6 Some theorists see the relationship between ethics and epistemology as more intimate than one of parallel. For 
example, Linda Zagzebski has argued that “epistemology is a branch of ethics” (Zagzebski 1996, xiv, 6). Others 
say things that seem to imply the two domains are not really distinct at all—perhaps one is simply a sub-domain 
of the other, or perhaps all evaluative claims in one are grounded in or in some way reducible to claims in the 
other. Such theorists will likely be skeptical of the idea of a distinctive form of epistemic blame; indeed, this is 
one of the sources of skepticism about epistemic blame mentioned above. Notice, however, that this simply 
reinforces the claim being made here: namely, that drawing parallels between ethics and epistemology is a way 
motivating epistemic blame. See Baehr (2012, 206-220) for helpful discussion of ways of understanding the 
relationship between ethics and epistemology (albeit one that is focused primarily around the distinction between 
intellectual and moral virtues).  
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3.2 The Role of Epistemic Blame in Epistemology  
The argument from parallels concludes that we should expect there to be such a thing as 
epistemic blame. In line with this expectation, epistemologists do increasingly deploy the 
notion of epistemic blame in debates about other epistemological issues. Jessica Brown is one 
of the leading theorists to point out the fundamental role that appeals to epistemic blame, 
blameworthiness, and blamelessness play in epistemological theorizing. She highlights the 
importance of blame-talk for the epistemic norms debates (Brown 2017, 1). She also argues 
that blame-talk is important in debates about epistemic justification. Regardless of whether one 
is a radical externalist,7 a standard reliabilist, or an internalist evidentialist about epistemic 
justification, it seems one must draw a distinction between justified and merely blameless belief 
in order to account for a fundamentally diverse range of cases (Brown 2020a; Boult 2019, 
2017a, 2017b; see also Williamson forthcoming; Littlejohn forthcoming).  
 For instance, given that radical externalists maintain that epistemic norms are factive, 
it seems there can be pairs of cases in which agents are unjustified with respect to a factive 
norm, but where there is nevertheless an intuitive normative difference between the cases. 
Perhaps agent A formed a false belief by wishful thinking, and agent B was carefully deceived. 
A and B both have unjustified beliefs by radical externalist lights; given the intuitive normative 
difference between the cases, we might worry whether radical externalists have a correct 
understanding of the nature of justified belief. In order to respond to this sort of worry, radical 
externalists typically appeal to the idea that the difference here comes down to a difference in 
blamelessness/blameworthiness. Agent A is unjustified and blameworthy, while agent B is 
 
7 A radical externalist endorses a factive conception of epistemic justification (Littlejohn 2012; Sutton 2007; 
Williamson forthcoming).  
 8 
unjustified but blameless. Similar points can be made about internalist evidentialism and views 
that fit somewhere between these two extremes, such as simple forms of reliabilism.8  
In addition to playing this role in debates about epistemic norms and epistemic 
justification, the concept of epistemic blame appears centrally in the large debate about the 
kind of control we have over our doxastic states. The main driver of that debate is the question 
of how, given the seeming lack of voluntary control we have over our doxastic states, people 
can ever be appropriate targets of blame, or other “deontological” forms of evaluation, 
concerning their doxastic states. A related literature directly explores the concept of 
“blameworthy belief”: theorists have developed complex accounts of the conditions under 
which someone counts as blameworthy for their doxastic states. There is a firm connection 
here with the doxastic voluntarism literature, insofar as theorists have typically sought to find 
conditions on blameworthy belief that do justice to the kind of control (or lack thereof) people 
seem to have over their doxastic states (Peels 2017; Nottelmann 2007; Montmarquet 1993, 
2008).9  
The amount of work that has been done in this area might make it seem as though the 
topic of epistemic blame is well-worn. But this would be a mistake. There are many 
philosophical issues surrounding blame and blameworthiness. Two importantly different 
questions are: what is blame? And when is blame appropriate? Answering the first question 
requires articulating the nature of blame, explaining what attitudes, actions, feelings, or 
dispositions make it the sort of thing it is. Answering the second question requires developing 
an account of the norms governing blame. It requires developing an “ethics of blame”. Under 
what conditions is it appropriate to blame someone? Should we ever epistemically blame 
 
8 See Brown (2020, 4-5) for discussion.  
9 Contributors to these debates about doxastic control and blameworthy belief do not always seem to be 
interested in the conception of epistemic blame I narrowed discussion down to in Section 2. In many cases, I 
find it somewhat unclear what conception of blame is at issue in these debates. 
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others? These sorts of questions obviously give rise to a wide range of further issues, many of 
which comprise distinct areas of study in their own right, including issues surrounding the 
standing to blame, the nature of excuses and forgiveness, and the value of our blaming 
practices.  
 
4. The Nature of Epistemic Blame  
The most detailed theorizing about the nature of epistemic blame has proceeded by drawing on 
existing work on the nature of moral blame and extending it to the epistemic domain. There 
are at least four main views in the literature: the emotion-based view (Rettler 2017; Nottelmann 
2007; McHugh 2012), the desire-based view (Brown 2020a), the relationship-based view 
(Boult 2020; 2021), and the agency-cultivation view (Piovarchy forthcoming). In this section, 
I briefly outline the main idea behind each of these approaches to the nature of epistemic blame. 
 
4.1 The Emotion-Based View   
According to the emotion-based view, epistemic blame is the manifestation of reactive attitudes 
such as indignation and resentment, directed towards a target as a result of the judgment that 
the target has (culpably) violated some epistemic norm. While few authors have spent time 
defending this idea explicitly, it is presupposed in a wide range of discussions in epistemology. 
For example, Nikolaj Nottelmann says: “It seems highly plausible that an agent’s epistemic 
blameworthiness may sufficiently justify attitudes such as resentment or indignation taken 
towards her, at least mild degrees of such attitudes” (2007, 3). Conor McHugh says, “We blame 
and even resent people, when, for example, they form foolish or hasty beliefs on matters of 
importance, and when they fail to believe what they should” (McHugh 2012, 66 (my 
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emphasis)).10 In a third example, after presenting three paradigm cases of epistemic blame, 
Lindsay Rettler says “...[the] blame specifically targets the faulty belief of another agent. The 
blaming agents hold others responsible for their beliefs by feeling resentment, indignation, and 
guilt, respectively” (Rettler 2017, 4). 
 It is fair to say that this way of understanding of the nature of epistemic blame has been 
the dominant view in epistemology until relatively recently. Perhaps one reason it has enjoyed 
this prominence is because emotion-based views of moral blame are highly prominent. Indeed, 
many seem to regard emotion-based views of moral blame as most closely aligned with our 
common-sense understanding of blame (Menges 2017; Strawson 1962; Wolf 2011; Wallace 
1994, 2013).  
Emotion-based approaches to moral blame have come under fire in recent years with 
powerful counterexamples. Many find it obvious that there are instances of “affectless blame”, 
cases in which we blame someone but do not feel any negative emotion. Sher offers examples 
of blaming dead people in the distant past, blaming one’s child for a relatively innocuous lie, 
or blaming a criminal for committing a burglary one casually reads about in the Saturday 
morning paper (2006, 90).11 It is interesting to note that, if the emotion-based account of moral 
blame faces challenges here, it seems—on the face of it, anyway—that an emotion-based 
account of epistemic blame is even more problematic. This is because an emotion-based 
approach to epistemic blame seems to be even more at odds with our actual normative 
practices: it is far from clear that reactive attitudes such as indignation and resentment are 
appropriate responses to the typical sorts of epistemic failings that many epistemologists use 
in their examples of epistemically blameworthy failings.  
 
10 McHugh here appears to treat blame as its own sui generis attitude, alongside resentment. I leave to one side 
the question of whether this excludes him from the emotion-based camp.  
11 See also Fricker (2016, 170) and Scanlon (2008, 128). 
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There is room for debate here. Some may find it plausible that indignation and 
resentment are just as at home in the epistemic domain as they are in the moral domain, and 
may be willing to defend an emotion-based view against apparent counterexamples 
accordingly.   
 
4.2 The Desire-Based View  
Recently, Jessica Brown (2020) has drawn on work from George Sher (2006) to defend a 
desire-based account of epistemic blame. Sher argues that moral blame consists in a 
characteristic set of dispositions—dispositions that we ordinarily associate with blame, such as 
dispositions to reproach, feel anger, verbally request reasons, and apologize (in the case of self-
blame)—unified in their causal connection to a certain belief-desire pair. The belief in question 
is that an agent has “acted badly” (a technical term, roughly referring to a culpable violation of 
a moral norm), and the desire is that they not have acted badly. According to the account, the 
dispositions characteristically associated with blame just are the sorts of things we should 
expect to result from the frustration of a person’s desire that the target of blame not have acted 
badly. Blame is what happens when our desire that people not culpably violate moral norms is 
frustrated.  
 Brown argues that this framework smoothly extends to the epistemic domain. 
Epistemic blame consists in a characteristic set of dispositions—dispositions that we ordinarily 
associate with epistemic blame, such as dispositions to reproach, feel upset, and verbally 
request reasons—unified in their causal connection to a certain belief-desire pair. According 
to Brown, the belief in question is that an agent has “believed badly” (a technical term roughly 
referring to a culpable violation of an epistemic norm), and the desire is that they not have 
believed badly. On this account, epistemic blame is what happens when a person’s desire that 
someone not have culpably violated an epistemic norm is frustrated.  
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 This account has a variety of advantages. For example, for those who worry about the 
awkwardness of indignation and resentment in the epistemic domain, the account does not 
require the manifestation of such attitudes in all cases of epistemic blame. Indeed, a virtue of 
the account is its flexibility: epistemic blame is plausibly a highly variable response; the 
account nicely accommodates this because there are many different behaviours and attitudes 
that we can expect the relevant desire frustration to give rise to.  
 Still, we might be worried about whether all cases of epistemic blame involve the 
desire that someone not have believed badly. Is it not possible to epistemically blame someone 
for an epistemic failing and nevertheless be glad of their mistake (consider epistemically 
blaming a rival)? While Brown has responses to such worries, it seems fair to wonder whether 
epistemic blame bears as intimate a connection to desires about bad beliefs as her account 
requires.12   
 
4.3 The Relationship-Based View  
We might agree with Brown that some kind of motivational component is necessary for 
epistemic blame. But precisely for reasons surrounding difficulties with the desire component, 
we might attempt to connect epistemic blame to a different kind of motivational component 
altogether.  
 According to Boult, epistemic blame is constitutively connected to a kind of 
relationship-modification. Drawing primarily on the work of T.M. Scanlon (2008; 2013), Boult 
argues that members of an epistemic community stand in an “epistemic relationship” with one 
another. This relationship consists in a reciprocal set of intentions and expectations that are 
oriented towards one another’s epistemic agency. When A epistemically blames B, A judges 
 
12 See Piovarchy (forthcoming) and Boult (2021) for critiques of Brown’s account. See Brown (2020, 12-13) for 
her discussion of these issues.   
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that B has done something that falls short of the “normative ideal” of this epistemic 
relationship, and modifies certain intentions and expectations that are partially constitutive of 
A’s epistemic relationship with B, in a way made fitting by that judgment. In a bit more detail, 
the idea is that when all goes well, members of an epistemic community expect of one another 
that they will meet certain epistemic conditions in the general running of their intellectual lives. 
Other things being equal, they also intend to trust one another’s word, unless they have good 
reason not to. On the relationship-based view, a paradigm form of epistemic blame consists in 
modifying one’s intention to epistemically trust the word of another upon judging that they fall 
short of certain epistemic expectations. For instance, if A reveals to B that A has a strong 
tendency to think dogmatically about human impact on climate change, B might modify her 
intention to epistemically trust A’s word on matters concerning human impact on climate 
change. Under certain conditions, this just is what epistemic blame consists in.13 
 One advantage of this approach is that it may avoid the controversy surrounding 
whether epistemic agents generally desire that people not culpably violate epistemic norms. It 
can also account for the variability of epistemic blame. According to the account, there are as 
many ways of epistemically blaming someone as there are ways of adjusting the intentions and 
expectations that comprise one’s epistemic relationship with that person. Additionally, the 
account strikes an ecumenical stance on indignation and resentment: manifesting such attitudes 
is one way of responding to a judgment of epistemic relationship-impairment, but there are 
many other ways that do not involve these attitudes. 
 A potential disadvantage of this approach is that it may inherit worries faced by 
Scanlon’s own account. A number of authors have accused Scanlon of “leaving the blame out 
 
13 How does this paradigm extend to cases of epistemic self-blame? We can simply countenance the idea that 
one has certain intentions and expectations oriented towards one's own epistemic agency, and that one can judge 
oneself to fall short of the relevant normative ideal, and modify one's intentions and expectations towards 
oneself in a way that is in some sense made fitting by this judgment. Perhaps the relevant modifications concern 
the degree to which one intends to epistemically trust oneself in the future, though other possibilities may be 
more fitting in the case of epistemic self-blame. 
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of blame” (Wallace 2013, 349). The account strikes some as too permissive when it comes to 
classifying cases. We might be worried that the same is true of an epistemic extension of the 
relationship-based framework. For example, we might worry whether intending to suspend 
one’s presumption of epistemic trust in the word of another is a robust enough response to 
count as a kind of blame response. That said, just as Brown has responses to the central worries 
for her account, Boult too has argued that such worries can be accounted for (Boult 2021, 16-
21). Indeed, in light of the apparent inappropriateness of indignation and resentment in the 
epistemic domain, it may be the case that what some regard as disadvantages of the framework 
in the moral domain are actually advantages for its epistemic extension.  
 
4.4 The Agency-Cultivation View  
For those skeptical of the idea that we can successfully theorize about epistemic blame by 
starting directly with questions about epistemic blame’s nature, recent work by Adam 
Piovarchy will be of interest (forthcoming). Piovarchy turns to a prominent defender of 
“forward-looking” approaches to moral responsibility—Vargas (2013)—and, extends Vargas’ 
ideas about moral blame to the epistemic domain.14  
According to Vargas, blame-reactions discourage certain kinds of behaviour while 
praise-reactions encourage others. Blame thus functions in a moral agent’s development as a 
kind of external motivator to behave in certain ways. This motivation gradually becomes 
internalized by the agent in the form of responsiveness to moral reasons. In a word, blame 
functions as a vector for moral agency cultivation: by internalizing the expectations and 
demands encoded in the blame responses of members of the moral community, agents become 
 
14 See McGeer (2013, 2014, 2015) and Jefferson (2019) for other influential forward-looking approaches to 
responsibility and blame.  
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sensitive to moral reasons.15 Similar to Sher, what blame consists in is a judgment that someone 
is blameworthy—meaning they are an appropriate target of certain interpersonal reactions, 
such as resentment and indignation—which in turn creates a disposition to engage in blame-
reactions—things like verbal condemnation, calls for censure or shame, avoidance, emotional 
distance—the expression of which communicates to the target of blame dissatisfaction with 
their violation of moral standards. According to the account, this sort of response is particularly 
well-suited to play the functional role of blame.  
Extending this idea to the epistemic domain, Piovarchy argues that epistemic blame 
functions as a kind of vector for epistemic agency cultivation. Just as members of the moral 
community have an aversion to moral blame-reactions, so to do members of the epistemic 
community have an aversion to epistemic blame-reactions. As a judgment connected to a set 
of negative interpersonal reactions, epistemic blame functions to discourage certain kinds of 
epistemic behaviours, and this in turn cultivates their epistemic agency, a kind of 
responsiveness to epistemic reasons.  
This approach would seem to enjoy a number of the benefits of Brown’s account (the 
story about the actions and attitudes typical of epistemic blame is very similar). And it has the 
added bonus of being naturally connected to a story about the value of epistemic blame. But 
the account also inherits a general set of worries faced by forward-looking approaches to blame. 
For example, blame may have many functions; one job is to explain why the particular function 
focused on by a given forward-looking account is the most central or important one. Another 
worry is whether blame is really the best means for performing that function (e.g. promoting 
 
15 To avoid objections to forward-looking accounts of blame, Vargas draws the following important distinction. 
He points out that his view is not that individual blame-reactions have the function of cultivating agency; rather, 
his view is that the practice of blame has the function of cultivating agency. On this picture, individual instances 
of blame can be justified by backward looking considerations, such as the judgment that a person is blameworthy. 
See Piovarchy (forthcoming, 18) for helpful discussion.  
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the uptake of epistemic agency), or whether there might be other, better ways to strive for. I 
return to a brief discussion of the forward-looking dimension of Piovarchy’s view below. 
 
5. The Ethics and Value of Epistemic Blame  
In addition to questions about the nature of epistemic blame, a number of important questions 
arise when thinking about the ethics and value of epistemic blame.  
 Regarding the first set of questions, perhaps most central are issues surrounding the 
“standing to blame”. In order for one’s blaming another person to be justified, not only must 
the target of blame have done something wrong, and be blameworthy for doing so, it seems 
certain facts about the blamer must obtain as well. A large literature has developed around 
questions about what these conditions on standing to blame are (Bell 2013; Fritz & Miller 
2018; Seim 2019; Radzik 2012; Todd 2017; Smith 2007). Some of the most prominent 
candidates include the idea that the blamer must not be guilty of committing the same 
wrongdoing as the target of blame (“hypocrisy condition”), or be complicit in that very 
wrongdoing (“complicity condition”); some have argued that the target of blame must in some 
sense belong to the same moral community as the blamer (“contemporary condition”), and, 
perhaps relatedly, that the target of blame’s wrongdoing must in some sense harm or affect the 
blamer or others close to them (“business condition”).16 
 To give a sense of the issues that may arise when thinking about epistemic blame in 
this context, consider just one example. We might wonder whether, or to what extent, epistemic 
norm violations really affect or harm anyone beyond the violators themselves. The question 
seems especially apt if we bear in mind that—as I indicated in Sec 2—epistemic blame as I 
 
16 Not everyone is convinced that “standing” is an important consideration when it comes to determining the 
appropriateness or justifiedness of blame. See Bell (2013) for a general critique. See also Dover (2019), for a 
critique of what I’m calling the hypocrisy condition.  
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understand it here concerns the violation of epistemic norms as such. Again, the idea is that 
this is part of what sets epistemic blame apart from moral blame; epistemic blame qua 
distinctive kind of blame-response does not concern the practical or moral consequences that 
may result from epistemic norm violations. Is a person’s violation of an epistemic norm, as 
such, really the business of anyone else? If so, what makes this the case? If the business 
condition is a bona fide condition on standing to blame, then these sorts of questions would 
seem to take on a considerable degree of importance (Boult forthcoming). Absent answers, we 
may be left wondering how it is possible for anyone to have the standing to epistemically blame 
anyone else, which may in turn be tantamount to a kind of skepticism about the very idea of 
epistemic blame. Room for future research in this area includes addressing whether the 
business condition applies in the epistemic domain. If it does, then future research could also 
aim to provide a more detailed understanding of whether and why epistemic failings can count 
as the business of others.  
 A different set of questions concerns the value of epistemic blame. What is the utility 
or value of our epistemic blaming practices? Should we epistemically blame one another? Or 
might we be better off replacing epistemic blame with something different? This area intersects 
with our understanding of the nature of epistemic blame. Views about the value of epistemic 
blame have differing degrees of plausibility depending on whatever it is we think epistemic 
blame consists in. 
 For example, going Brown’s route—and drawing on some further ideas from Sher 
(2006, 116-138)—we might argue that epistemically blaming others has value insofar as it 
reflects one’s care and concern for epistemic normativity. Recall, on this view, epistemic blame 
consists in dispositions caused by the frustration of a desire that people not believe badly. This 
desire, we might think, is reflective of one’s care and concern for epistemic normativity. Since 
caring about epistemic normativity seems to be something of value—perhaps both intrinsically 
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and instrumentally speaking—and epistemic blame reflects that caring, perhaps epistemic 
blame inherits value as a result. The desire-based view may be compatible with other stories 
about the value of epistemic blame, including ones that ground its value in more starkly 
instrumental considerations. But the foregoing is a possibility that bears a tight connection to 
essential commitments of the desire-based framework.  
 Going the relationship-based route, perhaps the value of epistemic blame consists in its 
role in facilitating cooperation amongst members of the epistemic community. Again, 
epistemic blame, according to this view, consists in certain modifications to the intentions and 
expectations that comprise one’s epistemic relationship with others in the epistemic 
community. So long as the modifications underpinning epistemic blame correspond to 
adjustments in one’s epistemic relations with others that are themselves epistemically 
advantageous—for example, intending to rely less on the word of someone one has realized is 
not epistemically trustworthy on a certain matter—then epistemic blame may be constitutively 
related to the epistemic value of a well-functioning epistemic community.  
 Piovarchy is perhaps most overtly concerned with the connection between his 
account of blame and the value of epistemic blame (what he refers to as the “justification” of 
epistemic blame). After all, he defends a functional approach that orients itself around 
considerations about what epistemic blame is for. Since a story about blame’s function is built 
into the account, what remains is an evaluation of whether that function is—in some sense—a 
good thing or not. As we’ve seen, according to Piovarchy, the function of the practice of 
epistemic blame is to bring people into the realm of epistemic agency, and to reinforce their 
capacities as epistemic agents (see fn.11). It seems hard to deny that such a practice has value. 
However, what does seem open to scrutiny is whether the specific behaviours and attitudes 
involved in our epistemic blaming practices are the best way to achieve this aim.17  
 
17 For helpful discussion, see: Fricker 2016, 174; Queloz 2021; Coates 2020. 
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6. Conclusion  
Epistemic blame is an important concept in a wide range of epistemological debates, including 
debates about doxastic voluntarism, epistemic justification, epistemic norms, and the “ethics 
of belief”. But only recently has it begun to be explored at the level of detail found in research 
on the nature and ethics of moral blame. These developments promise to be fruitful in a variety 
of ways. First, a better understanding of the nature of epistemic blame may have implications 
for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, the more closely 
related epistemic blame is to moral blame, the more vindication we might find for approaches 
to epistemic normativity that understand it as sharing interesting and important features with 
practical normativity. Conversely, the more disparate these kinds of blame are, the more reason 
we may have to question analogies that are sometimes drawn: to what extent are epistemic 
obligations like moral obligations?  When we epistemically “ought” to φ, how similar is this 
to when we morally ought to φ? What are the fundamental differences? Comparing kinds of 
blame invites us to think about these questions in a way that moves beyond the platitude that 
epistemology concerns the evaluation of belief, while ethics concerns the evaluation of action. 
A more nuanced understanding of the nature of the responses appropriately directed towards 
normative failings in these respective domains may contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of the nature of the normativity governing those domains.18  
 Second, there is promise in connecting work on the ethics of epistemic blame to other 
increasingly active areas of epistemology, such as testimonial injustice and political 
epistemology. To take just one example, the common range of shortcomings for which people 
are typically regarded as appropriate targets of epistemic blame includes things like biased 
 
18 See Kauppinen 2018 for a discussion of how to identify different kinds of norms by connecting violations of 
them to the appropriateness of different kinds of reactive attitudes. See also Schmidt 2021 for an application of 
Boult’s relationship-based account of epistemic blame in this context.  
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cognition, ignoring the evidence, and wishful thinking. But we might wonder whether people 
can be appropriate targets of epistemic blame for a wider range of actions or attitudes, such as 
the perpetration of testimonial injustice (Fricker 2007; Maitra 2010; Polhaus 2014; Wanderer 
2012, 2017). Moreover, expanding this thought to the intersection of epistemic injustice and 
political epistemology, we might wonder whether and how epistemic blame can be assigned to 
individuals or collectives in cases of hermeneutical injustice (Hänel 2020; Jackson 2019; 
Medina 2012; Pohlhaus 2012; Fricker 2007). Answers to these questions have the potential to 
enrich debates about the nature of the harm that attends epistemic injustice,19 as well as the 
social dimensions of epistemic responsibility.20  
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